Mercenaries and ‘Randori’

Alongside the feudal framework of Sengoku armies were others from outside this framework. These were mercenaries, fighting for plunder, or in the hope of reward. As is usually the case with the Sengoku, they could come from a variety of backgrounds.

Some people were driven by desperation due to famine or other natural disaster to enlist in armies in order to gain food, but also in the hope of gaining plunder either from fallen enemies or from the environment. Other groups were essentially living from banditry, and would attach themselves to armies when they heard a campaign was in the offing, again attracted by the prospect of loot.

This form of looting is usually known as ‘randori’ (or ranbōdori 乱取り/乱妨取り),  and included the abduction of people as well as goods. These people taken in war may be taken back home to be forced into servitude or sold as slaves to a third party. There is a theory that the Imagawa troops at Okehazama were not, in fact, resting and eating when they were surprised by Oda Nobunaga, but were dispersed in pursuit of plunder.

^Osaka Summer Campaign battle screen illustrating ‘randori.’

When Uesugi Kenshin attacked Oda Castle in Hitachi province in 1566, his soldiers raided the area, and it is said that under Kenshin’s official approval, the people taken during the raid were sold as slaves in the castle town at a low price of 20-30 mon per person. Though, it’s worth pointing out that one of Kenshin’s biographers claims that the taking of the castle and the selling of slaves were separate events. The original document has a line between the two, but the line was omitted by a Meiji copyist.

Climate research has shown that the second half of the 16^th century in Japan was warmer and drier than the first half, leading to more famines. With food scarce, more people would be driven to the battlefield in search of food and loot. Daimyō would often try and attack opponents’ territory during harvest time, both to take food for their own men and take it away from the enemy. When looking at the timing of the Echigo Uesugi clan’s dispatch of troops to other provinces for example, there are two patterns: short-term from late autumn to the end of the year, and long-term from late autumn to spring-summer of the following year. Uesugi Kenshin often spent the winter in enemy territory in the Kantō when campaigning against the Hōjō. In fact, Edo-period tales notwithstanding, Uesugi Kenshin spent a lot more of his time fighting the Hōjō than he ever did the Takeda.

^ Chart showing military activity compared with the agricultural year. 1561 has an intercalary month after the 3rd month due to the lunar calendar.

The motivations of these mercenaries could be quite different. Some would merely have joined to steal as much as possible with as little risk, others may be positively reckless in search of reward for actions on the battlefield or the prospect of looting fallen enemies. And of course, both these two types could be present in the same ‘unit.’

In addition to outlaws and men driven by desperation to the battlefield, there were also those living in one domain who would voluntarily seek employment as irregular soldiers in another.  According to a law established by the Yūki clan, feudal lords in Shimōsa Province, anyone leaving the Yūki fief to engage in banditry in the employ of another lord would have any rewards and possessions confiscated, and were liable to lose their territory as well. Clearly the issue of people going to fight in neighbouring areas was a serious enough problem for the Yūki to legislate. And, given the stipulation about losing territory, some of those mercenaries were of the warrior class.

The Hōjō unit mentioned in a previous post, the Sho-ashigaru-shū (諸足軽衆),  whose commander was Daifuji Masanobu, the lord of Tahara Castle, was a fighting group that specialized in ‘guerilla warfare, such as ambushes and raiding. These were originally a mercenary group that may have been brought under more direct Hōjō control and employed as irregular warfare specialists. With the transition towards formation of units by weapons groups, mercenaries would also be brought into that system.

This is typical of the trend towards more daimyō control as the Sengoku period goes on. Where daimyō could impose more control over their warriors (such as the Yūki clan legislation), they did so, and it’s this increase in authority that is thought to be the enabling factor for separation of troops into ‘weapons groups,’ a framework that mercenaries would also be brought into. Ultimately this trend would lead to the separation of classes in the 1580’s across the country (notionally at least). But this was a trend that was already occurring to a lesser or greater extent across Japan, rather than a system purely imposed from above. Hideyoshi merely standardised what was already happening among the daimyō. The wild mercenaries from the lower classes, along with land-holding independent samurai would ultimately be replaced by the compliant warrior class of the Edo period.

^Osaka Summer Campaign battle screen

Later on in the period as well, we start to see daimyō applying strict laws to the behaviour of armies, both in camp and on the march, with Hideyoshi prohibiting the practice of randori. This is not to say it still didn’t happen however, as the illustrations of troops engaged in randori on the Ōsaka battle screen show. The practice of randori illustrates the grim reality of Sengoku Jidai warfare, alongside the elaborate armours, colourful banners and tea ceremonies is the widespread human misery and death inflicted on the defenceless.

 

Wargaming

From now on, I’m going to mostly try and give specific examples for how I might treat the subject matter in my own rules rather than making generic points about all rules. I think this may be a more useful exercise, and may be more helpful as more concrete examples to spur suggestions for use in other rules.

For Tenka Fubu, the presence of mercenaries is really just another consideration to take into account when assessing the overall rating of the sonae, so a lot of mercenaries may make the sonae harder to activate. The practice of randori is more of a post-battle phenomenon, but a scenario could have sonae that are susceptible to randori. For example, these sonae could take a hit if activating on a ‘10’ to move into a cultivated square, (the hit representing some troops dispersing to loot, the hit could be rallied as usual representing those troops being brought back into line). A unit like the Sho-ashigaru-shū could be given the old wargaming staple of being able to move through rough going at a normal rate, but could also be set up in ambush, and given bonuses to change orders from attack to regroup and vice versa.

For Ningen Gojūnen, a mercenary unit may be harder to activate to represent its unruly nature, but also generate yūsha counters at a higher rate, say on a 9+ instead of a 10, to represent those individuals in reckless pursuit of battlefield rewards. Given the scale of the game, randori is more likely to be a post battle event rather than need to be modelled on the tabletop unless for a specific scenario.