Social Class and Organisation by Weapon Type

One of the objections to the idea of troops being taken away from their feudal lord and re-constituted into units of the same weapon type is that it breaks the feudal relationship (shujūkankei) that those troops have with the person who raised them. That is, warriors who bring retainers to the battlefield are not going to want them to be taken away and commanded by someone else. Historian Nishimata Fusao offers a defence of his theory of organisation by weapon type against this objection.

First, some caveats. By his own admission, Nishimata is only familiar with the practice of the Eastern daimyō, especially the Hōjō, and accepts that other areas may have been different. And what follows is only applicable to ‘daimyō armies’ rather than other armed groups such as village ikki or kokujin groups (kokushū). Also, even though the terms ‘zōhyō‘ and ‘ashigaru‘ are usually used interchangeably, for the sake of clarity here Nishimata uses ashigaru to mean mercenaries and zōhyō to mean feudally raised troops.

Nishimata posits 5 different types of people in a Sengoku daimyō army:

A: Samurai

B: Ashigaru mercenaries

C: Zōhyō. Troops raised through military service.

D: Subordinates and ancillaries to the samurai.

E: Hyakushō. Rural population mobilised as porters and labourers.

Group A was composed of mounted warriors (meaning they rode a horse to the battlefield even though they would normally fight dismounted) who would mostly be from traditional warrior families.

Group B are mercenary groups such as the sho-ashigaru-shū of the Hōjō mentioned before. These would be mostly non-samurai, but not necessarily exclusively. They would normally fall under the direct control of the daimyō.

Group C are troops raised by the daimyō’s vassals from their own lands. These are part-time warriors raised for the duration of a campaign. It’s these that are divided up to form the weapon groups.

Group D are attendants of the samurai, such as grooms for the horses, personal baggage carriers, weapon carriers, attendants etc. They are effectively the ‘support team’ for the mounted warrior. Therefore, they are ‘semi-combatants,’ in that they are not supposed to fight, but may get caught up in the fighting due to close attendance on their lord.

Group E are the porters etc recruited from villages. These are the actual ‘conscripted peasants’ rather than the ashigaru of popular imagination. Villages would be expected to provide labourers in time of war, though they would sometimes pay an extra tax to the daimyō instead to avoid giving up valuable workers. Daimyō would then hire people from elsewhere instead.

Nishimata posits a ‘2-part’ army. He notes that non-samurai could be members of groups B,C,D or E, but they could not be members of A without changing their social class. It is often pointed out that there wasn’t the clear difference between ‘samurai’ and ‘non-warriors’ in the Sengoku as is commonly thought. And this is something I’ve mentioned on this ‘blog several times. But that is not to say that there was no difference at all. In fact, most samurai WERE a distinct class in that their business was war, and their main focus was fighting and training for war. It is only at the fringes of the class that ambiguities occur. It was certainly easier to move from one social class to another than it was in the Edo period, but it was still difficult.

For the A group, a feudal unit would continue to fight together so there would be no interference with the feudal relationship. Groups B and E are hired by the daimyō, group D are attendants on group A. That just leaves group C.

It is Nishimata’s contention that this group would mostly be composed of ‘surplus population’ rather than permanent residents of villages within a samurai’s domain. These could be men who had absconded from their home village due to disaster, war or other misfortune. If that is the case, then there is no formal feudal relationship between these men and the samurai who raised them, they are effectively ‘casual workers’ hired for the duration of a campaign.

Let’s return to our old friend Miyagi Yasunari. His military service includes these various types. The 7 horsemen with him are from group A. They are mounted warriors with heavy armour. They may be family members of Miyagi’s clan, but they could also include ‘rōtō,’ or people from non-warrior families who had over time attached themselves as permanent retainers to a samurai. As far as equipment goes, they are essentially the same. However, the bow and gun armed troops he brings are also marked as ‘samurai’ indicating that these were probably permanent warrior retainers. But, if these go to the missile units, then that presumably breaks the feudal relationship. The long spears and infantry are, according to this theory, part-time warriors originally from outside Yasunari’s territory. The various attendants of the samurai group are not recorded, as they are, strictly speaking, non-combatants. Each samurai would decide how many attendants he wanted to bring.

I would say that I’m not entirely convinced by this. I doubt if there was sufficient surplus population to avoid raising residents from one’s own villages. While Nishimata points out that Hōjō territorial holdings were quite complex and it wasn’t unusual for two lords to ‘share’ a village, or have territory in an area belonging to a different military division. But this couldn’t have been universal down to the lowest samurai, for whom their fief must have been a single territorial unit. There is also the issue of Yasunari’s guns and bow being labelled as effectively ‘samurai,’ yet sent to the gun and bow units anyway.

The simpler explanation for the breaking of feudal relationships is that warrior society changed to the point where it was no longer seen as an issue. This is why I think an increase in daimyō authority is a better explanation for this change. It is entirely likely that the increase in surplus population as a source for troops led to a ‘devaluing’ of the feudal bond amongst the vassals of the daimyō and their retainers. This would push the time of a shift towards organisation by unit type later in the period than Nishimata proposes, and would perhaps happen alongside the gradual separation of classes. The problem is, there is no contemporary evidence for any such attitudinal shift among warriors of the time.

We do see other evidence of increases in daimyō authority, for example the banning of private feuds and revenge killing in favour of arbitration of disputes by the daimyō. This would go against a warrior’s natural sense of  independence, but was presumably mostly followed. Though we also see a lot of pushback from samurai against this. Naitō Masatoyo famously declaring that he would ignore Takeda Shingen’s law in this respect offering the impeccable logic that any warrior who would obey such an order would be no use as a warrior to Shingen anyway. Daimyō power in respect to their vassals would vary considerably and likely waxed and waned throughtout a daimyō’s career.

All in all, this isn’t terribly helpful to wargamers who want to know how to categorise and organise their units. Again, the difficulty is even if you have an idea of how the model might have worked, there remains the problem of knowing exactly how to apply it to any individual daimyō.